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DO PREGNANT WOMEN HAVE (LIVING) WILL?*
DANIEL SPERLING**
Living wills are documents that instruct health care providers about
particular kinds of medical care that an individual would or would not want to have
if rendered incompetent. Under the American legal system, pregnant women are
not typically allowed to express their will merely due to the fact they are pregnant.
In other cases, their will is much weaker than those of other women, not to mention
those of other men. In Canada, however, the law is silent on this matter: in
contrast to the American legal system, no special provision relates to the state of
pregnancy. From this silence one can infer two possible conclusions. According
to the first, Canada has a gap in its living will legislation concerning pregnant
women. This gap could be attributed to legislators who were not fully aware of the
possibility that incompetency may also occur during pregnancy. According to the
second potential conclusion, Canada considered the American model and decided
to reject it due to legal and cultural differences between the two nations. Of
course, choosing one interpretation over the other has far-reaching practical
implications. But, what do we have to choose?
It is believed that advance directives in general, and living wills in particular,
have three important purposes. 2  First, by issuing an advance directive, an
individual is exercising her control over health care decisions concerning her body
and State of health. Validating an advance directive is giving respect to the
patient's prior wishes and to her right to self-determination, which does not
extinguish should the signor of the advance directive become incompetent.
3
However, advance directives also have an important procedural role: they prevent
the need to go to court whenever a problem occurs as to what the patient would
have decided in the relevant case had she had the opportunity to do so. Just as
* This Article is an excerpt from chapter 3 of my book, MANAGEMENT OF POST-MORTEM PREGNANCY:
LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS, forthcoming with Ashgate in 2005.
** S.J.D. Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
1. The degree of incompetency under which an advance directive should operate is debatable.
Originally, advance directives apply when the patient is alive but incapacitated, and unable to make
reasonable, or indeed, any decision concerning his or her health matters. However, it seems plausible to
argue that advance directives can also apply when the patient becomes dead. Under these
circumstances, an advance directive functions like a donor card or a will, providing for treatment of the
body after death. Ed Newman, Ethical Issues in Terminal Health Care, Part Four: Patients Have
Rights, but Doctors Have Rights, Too (1992), http://www.cp.duluth.mn.us/-ennyman/DAS-4.html (last
visited May 18, 2005).
2. ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 6 (2d ed. 1995).
3. Id.
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important, they provide physicians with immunity from civil and criminal liability
by offering solutions that reside with the patient, even when incompetent.4
Legislation usually regulates advance directives. Advance directive statutes
allow individuals to make decisions about the kind of care they want, if they are
unable to make decisions on their own, and to appoint another person to make
those decisions for them. They provide a mechanism that advances the ethical
principles of individual autonomy, self-determination, and bodily integrity. The
legislation provides the form of the document, the procedure to create it, and the
scope of its effect. Living will legislation actually reflects the recognition by the
state that the incompetent adult has the right, if the expression of intent is made, to
have medical treatment discontinued or otherwise prescribed, and, thus, that courts
should uphold the individual's living will.
A. CANADA
In Canada, advance directive legislation exists over almost all the country.'
Such legislation covers the provinces of Alberta,6 British Columbia,7 Manitoba,
New Brunswick, 9  Newfoundland,' °  Nova Scotia,
11  Ontario, 12  Quebec, 13
Saskatchewan, 14 Prince Edward Island, 15 and Yukon Territory. 16  Although
legislation varies among these provinces and territories, none of these extensive
4. Id. at 7.
5. For a discussion of the legal status of living wills in Canada see UNIV. OF TORONTO JOINT
CENTRE FOR BIOETHICS, LIVING WILLS, http://www.utoronto.ca/jcb/outreach/livingwills_
download.htm (last visited May 18, 2005). See generally Quality of End-of-Life Care: The Right of
Every Canadian: Subcomm. To update "Of Life and Death" of the Standing Senate Comm. on Social
Affairs, Science and Technology, (2000), http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-
e/upda-e/rep-e/repfinjun00-e.htm (last visited May 18, 2005) (providing a detailed explanation of the
legislation).
6. Personal Directives Act, S.A., ch. P-4.03 (1996) (Can.), repealed by R.S.A., ch. S-19, § 7
(2000) (Can.).
7. Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 405 (1996) (Can.), http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/
statreg/stat/R/96405_01.htm (last visited May 18, 2005).
8. The Health Care Directives and Consequential Amendments Act, S.M., ch. 33 (1992) (Can.).
9. Infirm Persons Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, ch. 1-8. (1973), amended by ch. 45, 2000 S.N.B. I (Can.).
10. Advance Health Care Directives Act, S.NFLD., ch. A-4.1 (1995) (Can.),
http://www.gov.nf.ca/hoa/sr (last visited May 18, 2005).
11. Medical Consent Act, R.S.N.S., ch. 279, § 1 (1989) (Can.), http://www.canlii.org/ns/laws/
sta/rl989c.279/20041103/whole.html (last visited May 18, 2005).
12. Substitute Decisions Act, S.O., ch. 30 (1992) (Can.).
13. Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q., ch. 64, § I (1991) (Can.).
14. Health Care Directive and Substitute Health Care Decision Makers Act, S.S., ch. H-0.001
(1997) (Can.).
15. Consent to Treatment and Health Care Directives Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. 10 (1996), amended by
ch. 5, 2000 R.S.P.E.I. (Can.).
16. Enduring Power of Attorney Act, R.S.Y.T., ch. 73 (2002) (Can.), http://www.canlii.org/yk/
sta/pdf/ch73.pdf (last visited May 18, 2005).
[VOL. 8:2:331
Do PREGNANT WOMEN HAVE (LIVING) WILL?
legislative frameworks has a specific provision from which one can infer that the
legal effect of an advance directive is influenced by whether the patient, who
issued the living will, is pregnant or not. Thus, it seems that without any specific
regulations for pregnant women deemed incompetent, Canadian law treats the
incompetent pregnant woman who issued an advance directive while competent
the same way as it treats other incompetent patients, that is, it respects the patient's
right to control his or her care.
B. UNITED STATES
1. Regulation of Pregnancy Clauses
The legal structure of living will legislation regarding incompetent
pregnant women is different in the United States than in Canada. Generally, in the
United States, living will legislation of states differs from the Canadian legislation
in that they allow the use of a living will only when a patient is terminally ill, or
after a prognosis showing that the patient would not recover. While all the states
have enacted some form of advance directive legislation, only 35 contemplate the
validity of the advance directive when a woman is pregnant.' 7 Each of these
statutes has specific guidelines as to the applicability of an advance directive when
a woman who makes the advance directive is pregnant. While these guidelines
reflect a practical balance between the constitutional rights of an incompetent
17. These states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 22-8A (1997 & Supp. 2004); Alaska, ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.52.055 (Michie 2004); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004);
Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); California, CAL. PROB. CODE §
4670-8 (West 1991 & Supp. 2005); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 15-18-104 (West 1997 & Supp.
2004); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-574 (West 2003); Delaware, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
16, § 2503() (2003); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005); Georgia, GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(a)(1) (2001); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-3 (West 2004) (repealed
1999); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 39-4504(4) (Michie 1996); Illinois, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c)
(West 1992 & Supp. 2004); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-8(d) (Michie 1993); Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103 (2002); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.631 (Banks-Baldwin 2004);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.13 (West 1996 & Supp. 2005); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. §
459.025 (West 1992); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-106 (2003); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-408 (Michie 1997); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.624 (Michie 2000); New
Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:14 (1996); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03
(2002); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.13, 1337.15, 1337.17, 2133.06, 2133.08 (Anderson 2002
& Supp. 2003); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101.4, 3101.8 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005);
Pennsylvania, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5414 (West Supp. 2004); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §
23-4.11-6 (1996); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-504 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 2004);
South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-10 (Michie 1994); Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 166.049 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2004); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109 (1993);
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1)(d) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); Wisconsin, WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-102(b) (Michie
2003). See generally, Amy Lynn Jerdee, Note, Breaking Through the Silence: Minnesota "s Pregnancy
Presumption and the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 971 (2000) (discussing
refusal of medical treatment by pregnant women).
2005]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
pregnant woman and the interests of the state in protecting potential life (or, even
further, the interests of a fetus), the requirements represented in each of the statutes
differ from one state to another. Nevertheless, they can be roughly divided into the
following six categories:
1. Total Disregard ofAn Advance Directive During the Entire Pregnancy.
This category is the most frequent, appearing in 17 states.18 Statutes under
this category declare that an advance directive of a person who becomes pregnant
has no effect during pregnancy.
2. Possibility, Probability, or Medical Certainty that the Fetus Will Develop
to Live Birth.
Some states have legislation that does not give effect to an advance
directive if it is probable,' 9 possible,20 or supported by medical certainty2' that the
fetus will develop to live birth.
18. Alabama, ALA. CODE § 22-8A (1997 & Supp. 2004); California, CAL. PROB. CODE § 4670-8
(West 1991 & Supp. 2005); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-574 (West 2003); Hawaii,
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-3 (West 2004) (repealed 1999); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 39-4504(4)
(Michie 1996); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-8(d) (Michie 1993); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §
65-28,103(a) (2002); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (West 1992); New Hampshire, N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 137-H:14 (1996); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06(B) (Anderson 2002);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §3101.4, 3101.8 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005); South Carolina, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-77-70 (Law Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 2004); Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 166.049 (Vernon 2001& Supp. 2004-05); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109 (1993); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §70.122.030(1)(d) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. §
154.03 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-102(b) (Michie 2003). It is
interesting to note here that Oregon law lists abortion as one of the limitations for which the durable
power of attorney is not authorized to consent. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.540 (2003).
19. ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040 (Michie 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.16, § 25036) (2003); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-9-106(6) (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-408(3) (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
449.624(4) (Michie 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.11-6(c) (1996). This language can also be found in
theUniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act , which reads: "Life sustaining treatment must not be
withheld or withdrawn pursuant to a declaration from an individual known to the attending physician to
be pregnant so long as it is probable that the fetus will develop to the point of live birth with continued
application of life-sustaining treatment." NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS,
Uniform Rights of the Terminally II Act § 6(c), (1989), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
fnact99/1980s/urtia89.pdf (last visited May 18, 2005).
20. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-
206(c) (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 2004);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.13(3) (West 1998 & Supp. 2005).
21. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311-629(4) (Banks-Baldwin 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-
07(3) (2002).
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3. Viability of the Fetus.
Two states mention the viability criterion as a limit on the effect of the
advance directive. Colorado requires fetal viability before voiding an advance care
directive 22 Georgia requires that the fetus be non-viable for the discontinuation of
medical treatment.23
4. Physical Harm or Pain to the Pregnant Woman.
In addition to the requirement of reasonable medical certainty that the fetus
will develop to live birth, Pennsylvania and South Dakota require the assurance
that physical harm or pain to the woman can be alleviated. 4
5. Rebuttable Presumption of Continuation of Treatment.
The Minnesota advance directive law offers a unique approach. In 1998,
the Minnesota legislature fundamentally revised their existing advance directive
25law. Prior to 1998, Minnesota's pregnancy provision provided that:
In the case of a living will of a patient that the attending physician
knows is pregnant, the living will must not be given effect as long as it
is possible that the fetus could develop to the point of live birth with
continued application of life-sustaining treatment.26
With the 1998 amendment, the current pregnancy provision states that:
When a patient lacks decision-making capacity and is pregnant, and in
reasonable medical judgment there is real possibility that if health care
to sustain her life and the life of the fetus is provided the fetus could
survive to the point of live birth, the health care provider shall presume
that the patient would have wanted such health care to be provided,
even if the withholding or withdrawal of such health care would be
authorized were she not pregnant. This presumption is negated by
health care directive provisions . . . or . . . in the absence of such
provisions, by clear and convincing evidence that the patient's wishes,
while competent, were to the contrary.
2 7
22. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §15-18-104 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004).
23. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8 (2001).
24. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5414 (West 1975 & Supp. 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-10
(Michie 1994).
25. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145C (West 1998 & Supp. 2004).
26. Id. § 145B.13(3).
27. Id. § 145C.10(g) (emphasis added). For a general discussion on the new law in Minnesota see
Barbara J. Blumer, Minnesota's New Health Care Directive, 81 MINN. MED. 1 (1998) (emphasis
added), http://www.mnmed.org/publications/MnMed1998/September/blumer.cfm (last visited May 18,
2005).
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Hence, the new approach acknowledges the interest of the state in potential
fetal life, while still preserving the pregnant patient's right to withdraw treatment.
It also encourages health professionals to discuss the issue with women who are or
could become pregnant. This view goes beyond simply making the living will
void with pregnancy. It attempts to balance the woman's rights with those of the
state interest in protecting the life of the fetus.
6. Probability that the Fetus Would Not Be Born Alive.
In Ohio, life-sustaining treatment can be withheld or withdrawn, if "the
declarant's attending physician and one other physician who has examined the
declarant determine, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and in accordance
with reasonable medical standards, that the fetus would not be born alive." 28
The various legislative forms of restricting the woman's right to control her
care on the basis that she is pregnant are troubling. Not only are women deprived
of their right to determine their own treatment when incompetent, in some states
this deprivation occurs regardless of the stage of the incompetent woman's
pregnancy and heedless of whether the fetus is viable. This seems illogical: if the
woman were competent, she could abort her child without hesitation, at least
during her first trimester. But if she becomes incompetent during the first
trimester, she cannot ask to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, and is thus
compelled to save her pre-viable fetus's life.
2. Constitutionality of Pregnancy Clauses
More disturbing than the fact that pregnancy clauses exist is the fact that
they were not found to be unconstitutional under United States jurisprudence.
While the issue of constitutionality of pregnancy clauses has been raised in three
judicial opinions, none of these cases involved substantial debate over the
constitutional questions pregnancy clauses raise, nor about the serious implications
they have on women in general.
In University Health Services v. Piazzi, the Supreme Court of Georgia
implied that it would follow the pregnancy clause of Georgia, notwithstanding the
objections of the patient's family. 29 The court granted a hospital petition to
continue life-support procedures on a brain-dead pregnant woman, contrary to the
request of the patient's husband and family. The woman's wishes were unknown,
and there was no living will. The court held that, according to the law of Georgia,
28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06(B) (Anderson 2002).
29. Molly C. Dyke, Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes,
70 B.U. L. REV. 867, 871 (citing Univ. Health Servs., Inc. v. Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464 (Ga. Super.
Ct. Aug. 4, 1986)).
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the woman was dead and therefore had no protectable privacy interest. In addition,
the court ruled that because the pregnancy clause of the Georgia legislation
determined that the living will would be ineffective during pregnancy, the
woman's wishes regarding the living will were irrelevant. The Piazzi ruling has
led commentators to assume that the court's reliance upon the living will statute
indicates that it might reject the claim that the pregnancy clause is
unconstitutional. 30  The court, nevertheless, did not state that it was
unconstitutional.3'
Donna Piazzi did not leave any directive. Still, the court based its ruling on
the Georgia pregnancy clause. Perhaps the reason that the court relied on the
pregnancy clause is that the woman was dead under Georgia law. It is not clear
whether the court would have mentioned the pregnancy clause, let alone indirectly
validated its constitutional content, had she been legally alive. But if Donna did
not have any interests at all - a proposition for which the court did not provide any
authority - what additional weight did mentioning the pregnancy clause have in the
overall ruling? It seems to be none.
Another case in which the constitutionality of pregnancy clauses has been
raised is DiNino v. State ex. rel. Gorton.32 In DiNino, the plaintiff executed a
living will, adding a sentence declaring that the directive was the final expression
of her "legal right to consent to termination of any pregnancy," and that contrary to
the Washington Natural Death Act, it would "still have full force and effect during
the course of [her] pregnancy". 33 DiNino and her physician, who feared including
her directive in her medical file, sought a judgment declaring that her directive was
valid, and that no physician would be liable for obeying it. DiNino argued that her
constitutional right to privacy was infringed under the Act in two respects. First,
the provision directly inhibited her right to choose to have an abortion and second,
it directly infringed upon her right to choose to forego medical treatment.34
The Superior Court of King County, Washington, granted DiNino partial
summary judgment, declaring the pregnancy provision of the Natural Death Act
unconstitutional because, as drafted, the subsection inhibited a woman's right to
exercise control over her reproductive decisions; therefore, the provision violated
DiNino's fundamental right of privacy. The Superior Court, however, denied the
declaration of validity of a woman's directive because this directive attempted to
exercise full control over DiNino's reproductive decisions beyond the point where
30. Id. at 871.
31. Id.
32. 684 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Wash. 1984).
33. Id.
34. It is interesting to note that the state conceded that an individual could draft an advance
directive that contains a properly worded abortion provision, or alternatively, delete the pregnancy
provision of the model directive. Id. at 1300.
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the State has a legitimate interest in such decisions. Hence, both DiNino and the
state appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington.
On appeal, Justice Brachtenbach, writing for the majority, held that the
controversy was not "justiciable" under the meaning of the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act, under which DiNino and her physician brought the suit against the
state of Washington. Because the plaintiff was neither pregnant nor terminally ill,
her arguments concerning the unconstitutionality of the Natural Death Act
pregnancy provision were "purely hypothetical and speculative." The only issue in
controversy was whether Ms. DiNino could draft a declaration that differed in its
terms from that provided in the Natural Death Act. Since the state was willing to
concede that the form could differ or be absent from the pregnancy provision, a
fact which undermines the state's objective in enacting the pregnancy provision in
the first place, the court concluded that "in the abstract, the NDA itself does not
directly infringe any constitutional rights as claimed by the respondents. 35
Although the court admitted that the constitutional rights allegedly infringed
upon are important, it did not find the case to be one of "broad overriding public
import." Hence, the court did not think an advisory opinion on the
constitutionality of the Washington living will provision would be "beneficial to
the public or to other branches of government." However, despite the fact that the
court refused to express any opinion regarding the validity of DiNino's directive
and the constitutionality of the Washington pregnancy provision, it implied that in
a real controversy, DiNino's advance directive would have been effective. The
court said:
We express no opinion as to the validity of DiNino's directive as
drafted, for this must await a factual controversy. However, under the
facts presented, the respondents, as well as this court, can only speculate
as to the possible impact of the NDA on an individual who is pregnant
and is in a terminal condition.
3 6
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Dimmik explained why it is logically wrong
to hold, as the majority did, that there is no justiciability at the time a woman drafts
a directive under the Natural Death Act. In his words:
By the majority's reasoning, a woman must be pregnant and terminally
ill before the issue is ripe for determination. Whatever the impact of the
[Natural Death Act] in that circumstance, the woman whose directive
will then be 'justiciable' will never benefit from a ruling on the matter.
In fact, the case would run a very real danger of being declared moot
before a judicial decision could be made. And if, in its discretion, the
court chooses to address the issues on mooted facts, would that
35. Id. at 1300 (emphasis added).
36. Id.
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determination be based on any less speculation than a determination
under the circumstances now before US?
37
Justice Dimmik's hypothesis was realized six years later when the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in one of the leading decisions in the United
States, acknowledged the right of a pregnant woman to refuse a cesarean section
that was needed to save the life of her twenty-three-week-old fetus.38 The woman
could not benefit from the court's decision because she (and her fetus) died two
days after the forced medical treatment. As a result of this outcome, one has to
seriously ask whether moot cases are an appropriate forum in which courts should
decide these life-and-death issues.
Yet, courts continue to hold off on determining the constitutionality of these
pregnancy provisions. In Gabrynowicz v. Heitkamp,39 the plaintiffs challenged the
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act of North Dakota that invalidated an
advance directive at pregnancy. 40 The plaintiffs were husband and wife. The
woman sought to execute a living will and durable power of attorney (for her
husband) with the hope that it would have the same effect whether she was
pregnant or not. The plaintiffs argued that North Dakota's pregnancy clauses are
unconstitutional because they: 1) impose undue burdens on the right to terminate
pregnancy and make medical decisions under the First, Fourth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments; 2) deprive women of liberty (bodily integrity) without
due process, violating the Fourteenth Amendment; 3) discriminate on the basis of
gender, violating the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment; 4)
require an expression of adherence to the state's policy of protecting fetal life,
violating the right to make and decline to make an expression of belief under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments; and, 5) violate the right to free exercise of
religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
However, like the majority opinion in DiNino, the U.S. District Court for the
District of North Dakota chose not to discuss the constitutional questions and
dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for the technical reasons of standing and ripeness.
The court held that at the time of the claim, Ms. Gabrynovicz was neither pregnant
nor incompetent. Hence, the court did not see any "realistic danger" that the
statute in question would directly injure the plaintiffs. The court acknowledged
that section 23-06.4-07(3) of the statute authorizes medical treatment of a pregnant
37. Id. at 1301.
38. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (D.C. 1990).
39. 904 F. Supp. 1061, 1062-63 (D. N.D. 1995).
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-07(3) (2002). The statute provides: "Notwithstanding a
declaration executed under this chapter, medical treatment must be provided to a pregnant patient with a
terminal condition unless ... such medical treatment will not maintain the patient in such a way as to
permit the continuing development and live birth of the unborn child or will be physically harmful or
unreasonably painful to the patient or will prolong severe pain that cannot be alleviated by medication."
Id.
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patient without distinguishing on the basis of fetal viability, and so admitted that at
least some of the rights alleged by Ms. Gabrynowicz could be implicated.
Nevertheless, the court still considered these questions to be abstract and non-
justiciable.4'
Indeed, at the time of the trial, Ms. Gabrynowicz had not issued an advance
directive and in that sense her case was less ripe than DiNino's. However, both
women were fertile: they were ready to become pregnant and fully aware of the
consequences of their proposed (present or future) directives. It is unclear why the
courts avoided substantial discussion of their directives under the premise that the
issues were not yet ready for review. Is a state of loss of competency in which the
woman's wishes cannot be directly examined, a better model than a state of full
competency to use in evaluating her constitutional rights? Alternatively, did
DiNino or Gabrynowicz have to actually become pregnant to have their claims
heard? What if the validity of their advance directives is an important factor in
their decision of whether to conceive? Can the courts avoid these women's basic
rights as competent healthy persons to make choices concerning their health, body,
and reproduction?
Importantly, in DiNino, the court stated that Ms. DiNino or her physician had
to make a better effort to look for another physician who would be willing to place
the directive in her file. The court thus concluded that the real controversy was
between DiNino and her physician. But is the question before the court really
about who gets to file the directive? Does DiNino's physician have a duty to look
for another physician who will agree to file her directive? Will the latter be
immune from any possible liability? These questions show that the courts' rulings
on these matters may create, rather than resolve, inconsistencies in the law.
C. UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND
Advanced directives are valid under English law provided they are made
freely, without undue influence. It is also necessary for the person who issued an
advance directive to be competent and informed about the directive's legal
consequences. If a pregnant woman temporarily loses capacity, an advance
directive would be effective only if it specifically addressed the possibility of
pregnancy. In case of doubt, some scholars have argued that a directive refusing
all of the recommended forms of medical treatment is unlikely to be respected,
because the courts may assume that "the woman had not addressed her mind to the
circumstances which have arisen. ' ' 2 This also seems to be the case in Ireland.
Due to the well-recognized constitutional rights of the unborn, scholars have
41. Gabrynowicz, 904 F. Supp. at 1064.
42. Nicola S. Peart et al., Maintaining a Pregnancy Following Loss of Capacity, 8 MED. L. REV.
275, 279 (2000).
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recognized that courts in Ireland will tend to ignore any advance directive issued
and will protect the life of the unborn child, "unless there existed a grave, real and
substantial risk to the life of the [incompetent] mother. 4 3
However, this claim is not supported in legislation, nor in English case law.
Moreover, in its "Report on Mental Incapacity," the English Law Commission
disagreed with the United States' approach of suspending the effectiveness of
living wills during pregnancies." The Commission recommended that women of
childbearing capacity should address the possibility of a pregnancy when executing
advance directives. In section 5.25 of the report, the Law Commission said:
We do not . . . accept that a woman's right to determine the sorts of
bodily interference which she will tolerate somehow evaporates as soon
as she becomes pregnant. There can, on the other hand, be no objection
to acknowledging that many women do in fact alter their views as to the
interventions they find acceptable as a direct result of the fact that they
are carrying a child.45
The Law Commission view is in accordance with ethical guidelines on this
matter. In a supplement to its previous report, the Royal College of Obstetrics and
Gynecologists stated that if an incompetent pregnant woman, who was fully
informed, refused treatment during pregnancy in advance, her wishes should be
respected even at the expense of the fetus.46 However, if the woman referred in her
advance directive to some forms of treatment but had no opportunity to discuss
treatment during pregnancy, and if pregnancy is not mentioned in the directive,
"the directive could be declared invalid because the circumstances at the critical
time of decision were not clearly envisaged when the directive was made".47
Hence, although academic writing in the United Kingdom and Ireland may
support the view that a woman's advance directive should be invalidated during
pregnancy, such an approach is contradictory to ethical guidelines concerning a
pregnant woman's right to determine the fate of her care, and to the Law
Commission's 1995 report on mental incapacity that explicitly discussed this issue.
43. Asim A. Sheikh & Denis A. Cusack, Maternal Brain Death, Pregnancy and the Foetus: The
Medico-Legal Implications, 7 MEDICO-LEGAL J. IR. 75, 83 (2001).
44. LAW COMMISSION, MENTAL INCAPACITY, 1995, Cm. 23 1, § 5.25.
45. Id.
46. ROYAL COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS, COURT-AUTHORISED
OBSTETRIC INTERVENTION: A CONSIDERATION OF THE LAW AND ETHICS, §§ 3.4.2, 4.2, (1996)
http://www.rcog.org.uk/print.aspPagelD=109&Type=guidelines&GuidelinelD=33 (last visited May
18, 2005).
47. Id. § 3.4.2.
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CONCLUSION
A woman's decision to issue an advance directive and to have it effectuated
implicates her fundamental right to make decisions regarding procreation, family
relationships and bodily integrity. These are the most intimate and personal
choices a person makes in a lifetime. They are central to personal dignity and
autonomy and to the "life and liberty" interests that are protected under the
Canadian Constitution.
Pregnancy clauses that exist under American law should not be a model for
Canadian law. Not only do they infringe on a woman's right to refuse medical
treatment just because she is pregnant, and hence distinguish them from non-
pregnant women on the basis of their pregnancy, but they also discriminate toward
them on a gender basis and on the basis of their incompetency. In addition,
Pregnancy clauses trivialize the significance of the mother's self-defining and
conscientious choice by automatically overriding it. They ignore the pregnant
woman's family, pretending to protect potential life without even drawing the line
at the viability of the fetus. Finally, they control the woman's body, devalue it, and
bring it near a state of involuntary servitude.48 The woman's wishes are
automatically ignored simply because she is pregnant.
However, it is not enough to conclude that Canada should not follow the
American model of pregnancy clauses. A more active step should be taken, similar
to that in the United Kingdom, so that the American model should be publicly
discussed and rejected. No doubt should be left in such a significant area. It is
hoped that this Article initiates the debate on this central issue and helps future
pregnant women and their loving families and friends better handle these difficult
circumstances of incompetency.
48. Timothy J. Burch, Incubator or Individual?: The Legal and Policy Deficiencies of Pregnancy
Clauses in Living Will and Advance Health Care Directive Statutes, 54 MD. L. REV. 528, 555 (1995).
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